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AUTOPOIESIS IN AMERICA
Stephen Diamond*
These are all very interesting papers written by very intelligent
people. It is no criticism of them to suggest that, generally, the struc-
ture of the discussion has not significantly advanced since the Flo-
rence Symposium on Autopoiesis,' at which many excellent papers
were also presented. The autopoiesis theorists have not convinced
others, particularly Americans, that theirs is the only, or the best,
model of law in society. Nor have they felt themselves obliged by
criticism to alter significantly their own position and mute their
claims.
Unlike a sportscaster or a war correspondent, I shall not give my
estimate of the effectiveness of the challenges to autopoiesis, the
points scored and surrendered, the damage done. After succumbing
to the temptation to offer the unoriginal remark that an autopoietic
system is evidenced by the capacity of autopoiesis theorists to ignore
often and assimilate sometimes criticisms of their work-the same can
also be said of the critics of autopoiesis-I shall instead very sketchily
outline the pattern of criticisms of autopoiesis and then speculate
briefly on some of what is or may be at stake in the debate between
pro- and anti-autopoiesis forces.
Is autopoiesis presented as a theory or as a metaphor? If it is
offered as a characterization of what actually is, is the proposition
falsifiable? American critics are uncomfortable with the tautological
aspect of formal grand theory. Professor Niklas Luhmann is frus-
trated by his critics' refusal to restrict their talk to high theory.2
If it be only a metaphor, what makes it useful? And why should
everything be explained by one central metaphor drawn from biology?
Skeptical of theory, American intellectual pluralists like to admire
autopoiesis for some insights, but not for its universal structure.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School. B.A., Swarthmore College, 1967;
Ph.D., 1976, J.D., 1976, Harvard University. I would like to thank Chuck Yablon, Joel Rog-
ers, and Robert Gordon for discussing this subject with me, and Robert Gordon for generously
sharing a draft of his unpublished evaluation of autopoeisis.
I See AUToPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Gunther Teubner
ed., 1988) (collection of essays, many of which were delivered as papers at the Florence Sym-
posium) [hereinafter AUTOPoIETIC LAW].
2 Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of
the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1425-26 (1992).
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Theory qua theory provides only "aesthetic pleasure,"'3 which Amer-
icans admit defiantly yet perhaps guiltily.
4
Why is autopoiesis preferable to a description of law, economics,
etcetera, as various dialects of a political language? This question
leads to the problem with system boundaries, much debated in Flo-
rence and still at issue.- Professors Luhmann and Gunther Teubner
have done much to schematize the relationship between systems, but
have not satisfied the non-believers.6 Why is it so important that law
has discrete and maintainable boundaries? German heirs to the
Pandectist tradition feel some compulsion to insist on such bounda-
ries, but American academics have much invested in legitimating
their position within academe by emphasizing the ties between law
and other disciplines.
Autopoiesis does not fit comfortably with the common percep-
tion, at least in the United States, that the boundaries between law,
politics, and economics, for instance, are permeable, and indeed can-
not be independently defined. The subjective, low-level empirical ar-
guments which reflect such a perception frustrate Professor
Luhmann, who argues that his critics are often not rigorous as to the
level of generality in which they are speaking.
What American legal academic, after reading Robert Hale'-and
I note that Hale, not Roscoe Pound is a hero for contemporary Amer-
ican law professors of what passes in the United States for a theoreti-
cal bent--can conceive of the market as independent of the legal rules
which are constitutive of it? (I suspect that Professor Luhmann's ref-
erence to Pound' may be one of the very few times his name will be
uttered in an American law school this year.) Which American en-
tirely disagrees with Mr. Dooley's observation that the Supreme
Court follows the election returns9 -that the structure of legal science
cannot explain American law? Professor Luhmann would explain
3 Thomas Heller, Remarks at the Cardozo Law Review Symposium entitled, Closed Sys-
tems and Open Justice: The Legal Sociology of Niklas Luhmann (Mar. 4, 1991).
4 When this conference was in large part repeated at the Law and Society meetings in
Amsterdam in June 1991, the audience was large-the session took place in the grand hall-
and almost entirely European. Professor Luhmann and his work have a powerful, but re-
stricted appeal.
5 See AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 1.
6 See Peter Kennealy, Talking About Autopoiesis-Order from Noise?, in AUTOPOJETIC
LAW, supra note 1, at 349 (a summary of the debate between the supporters and critics of
autopoiesis).
7 ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE Gov-
ERNING POWER (1952).
8 Luhmann, supra note 2, at note 39 and accompanying text.
9 FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
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constitutional law as a coupling of law and politics. His system re-
mains intact, but as a pure theory of law is nowhere instantiated on
earth. Such an objection, of course, is by no means fatal to theory.
If law as a system is distinguished from the market as a system
because the former is normative, focused on right and wrong, or legal
and illegal, whereas the latter is concerned with costs and benefits and
gives us prices, why did Oliver Wendell Holmes classify so much
American law solely as a matter of price?' ° And why has American
law proved so susceptible to the arguments of the law and economics
movement?"
Do lawyers actually think differently from economists? I think
that our typical answer is sometimes yes and sometimes no. There is
a joke currently popular in the medical community that tells of a golf
foursome composed of a priest, a doctor, an historian, and a lawyer,
who were frustrated because the foursome in front of them were play-
ing very slowly. While they were grousing about this at the nine-
teenth hole, a club official explained that the earlier foursome were all
blind. The priest declared his delight. "What an inspiration-I'll add
this to my next homily." To shorten the story, the doctor and the
historian were equally enthusiastic. The lawyer, however, asked,
"Why don't they play at night?" Perhaps it is a distinctive attribute
of American lawyers that they, like American economists, can be as-
sociated with a crude, unfeeling, yet perhaps effective practicality.
12
Lawyers may face dissonance when they profess to act some-
times-or simultaneously-as agents of the client and sometimes as
officers of the court, but they do profess to do both. That is, auto-
poiesis does not resonate with the American experience of the legal
world, perhaps because the lawyer-the intermediary between the law
and other systems, such as the market-and not the commentator, is
seen as central to that world. To the lawyer, unlike the commentator,
10 See Robert W. Gordon, Holmes' Common Law and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 719, 736-37 (1982); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock
(Mar. 12, 1911), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 177, 177 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1946); Letter
from Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 25, 1883), in HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS, supra, at 19, 21.
11 See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 116-18 (1987); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at xix (3d ed. 1986); Clark Byse, Fifty Years of
Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1077-79 (1986).
12 Professor Luhmann insists that he is describing systems and not institutions. Niklas
Luhmann, Remarks at the Cardozo Law Review Symposium entitled, Closed Systems and Open
Justice: The Legal Sociology of Niklas Luhmann (Mar. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Luhmann Re-
marks]. But his disciples who criticize regulation, see infra text accompanying note 14, are
making institutional arguments, and in general, the abandonment of institutional claims leaves
the theory intact but of questionable relevance. The appeal of autopoiesis becomes an aesthetic
rather than an instrumental one.
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the law is never pure. Autopoiesis theorists do not, however, concede
that this is a weakness in their theory; practice always distorts theory,
they note dismissively.1
3
Finally, is the theory of autopoiesis a normative one? Sometimes
its proponents offer an anti-legislative, anti-regulatory critique. Don't
mess with another system's life world, as it were. And there is also, as
Dean Alan Wolfe has noted, 4 sometimes an assumption that an auto-
poiesis system should be preserved. Functionalism has presented sim-
ilar difficulties, being alternately a description and an evaluation of
practices.15 (Is the theory that what survives is functional, or that
what is apparently functional should survive?) Legal techniques often
seem insular and surprisingly durable, but do they never change deci-
sively, and should they never? Are there never moments of perceived
radical discontinuity between experiences and norms-paradigm
shifts, as it were, when, for instance, the formal equality and general-
ity of late nineteenth-century American law was understood to be
class-based and unfair?' 6 (Generality and universality of statutory
law were themselves ambitions which differentiated the mid-nine-
teenth century from what had come before.)
These are then some of the ambiguities and problems upon which
Dean Wolfe, 17 Professor Michel Rosenfeld,18 and others here and at
the Florence Symposium have elaborated.' 9 I turn now to what may
be at stake.
Autopoiesis theory resolutely denigrates the importance of the
individual human agent. (Professor Luhmann tells us that he talks of
individuals five billion at a time.)20 Autopoiesis theory is not, of
course, the only grand theory that does this. Theories of organic
growth, which Hubert Rottleuthner has noted2' closely resemble
13 While autopoiesis can be contrasted with American empiricism as an example of a Ger-
man penchant for abstraction and generality, it can also be understood as one of many recent
particularistic challenges to Enlightenment universalism. Like Slovakian or Croatian national-
ism, autopoiesis insists on the limited possibility for communication.
14 Alan Wolfe, Sociological Theory in the Absence of People: The Limits of Luhmann's
Systems Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1729 (1992).
15 See Ralf Dahrendorf, Out of Utopia: Toward Reorientation of Sociological Analysis, in
SYSTEM, CHANGE, AND CONFLICT 465 (N.J. Demerath III & Richard A. Peterson eds., 1967);
David Lockwood, Some Remarks on "The Social System," in SYSTEM, CHANGE, AND CON-
FLICT, supra, at 281.
16 1 owe this formulation to Robert Gordon.
17 See Wolfe, supra note 14.
18 See Michel Rosenfeld, Autopoiesis and Justice, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1681 (1992).
19 See AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 1.
20 Luhmann Remarks, supra note 12.
21 Hubert Rottleuthner, Biological Metaphors in Legal Thought, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW,
supra note 1, at 97.
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autopoiesis, also tend to denigrate the individual's significance, as
does structuralism. Such an approach is appealing for several rea-
sons. It conveys the reassurance of order and system not contingent
upon spontaneous and capricious free will. It thus offers hope for the
preservation of freedom in the Hayekian or common law sense offree-
dom from: 22 the constraints one lives under are not created by identi-
fiable human beings; one does not live under the will of another.
This observation is reassuring, but only partly so, since the the-
ory does not just minimize another's free will, but one's own as well.
John Stuart Mill faced this same dilemma. He wrote in his autobiog-
raphy of his giddy delight as an over-educated youth, in utilitarianism
and in the sense of personal power and potential to reshape the envi-
ronment.23 Then he had what is known as his "mental crisis," when
he considered that he in turn might well be the environment being
shaped by another,24 a particularly poignant fear given his relation to
his father. That is, human agency is usually attractive if one con-
siders one's own freedom and power, but not if it suggests that an-
other may have power over one. Some people are reluctant to ham-
string themselves just to hamstring others-Thomas Jefferson for
one.
25
A similar concern lies behind Bruce Ackerman's efforts,2 6 ques-
tionable though I might ultimately find them, to see three revolutions
in American history: the one going by that name, the Civil War, and
the New Deal-all liminal movements which decisively transformed
American constitutional law and did it through ordinarily illegiti-
mate, or at least problematic, mechanisms. Ackerman wants routine
and inbred law, but occasional radical change as well.27
In American law, any decision can be, and at various times prob-
ably has been, explained as the result of the exercise of a judgment or
policy, or as the consequence of a jurisdictional determination. One
view exaggerates individual potency; the other denies it. You pays
your money and you takes your choice.
The denial of human agency, with its rejection of spontaneity and
22 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973).
23 JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 42-44 (Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal Arts
Press 1957) (1873).
24 Thomas Haskell eloquently and persuasively elaborated on this subject in an unpub-
lished speech entitled, Persons as Uncaused Causes: John Stuart Mill, The Spirit of Capitalism,
and the "Invention" of Formalism, which he delivered in January 1991 at the Association of
American Law Schools Conference.
25 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 233-42 (3d prtg. 1966).
26 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 58 (1991).
27 Id. at 58-61.
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free will-or, at least, the placing of the theoretical focus elsewhere-
is appealing for intellectual as well as for political reasons. Auto-
poiesis is couched on a level of abstraction and with a magisterial
perspective which permits the assertion of regularity and pattern.
Critics, therefore, cite a myriad of events, motives, behaviors, etcetera,
which the theory of autopoisesis necessarily overlooks. Professor
Luhmann then laments the theoretical ambiguity behind these recita-
tions.28 Autopoiesis theorists purport to present a theory in history,
but, like Herbert Spencer,29 they avoid details.
For some, grand theory is very satisfying. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who often aspired to be a philosopher in this style, periodi-
cally complained that philosophers considered themselves to be little
gods who try to contain the whole world within their own minds.30 Is
grand theory commendable ambition or hubris? (Holmes thought
that the aspiration was human but that good sense required that one
always knows that one had not achieved it.)3I I confess that I, like
most of the critics, am an American fox nipping at the heels of the
German hedgehog, but my perspective is justified only by taste, which
is clearly culturally shaped, and I respect Professor Luhmann's seri-
ousness of purpose and breadth of learning. Different strokes for dif-
ferent folks.
Several years ago, I attended a fascinating conference of German
and American legal academics in Bremen.32 The cultural differences
between the two groups were striking. The Germans thought that the
Americans were irresponsibly casual in their promiscuous acceptance
of theoretical inconsistency. The Americans thought the Germans
28 Luhmann, supra note 2, at 1423.
29 HERBERT SPENCER, THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY (University of Michigan Press 1961)
(1873).
30 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (Feb. 26, 1918), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETrERS 138, 139 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953). Holmes also commented spe-
cifically about German scholarship. He wrote, "I am more than ever impressed by the thor-
oughness of the Germans in systematizing, while I believe that the real contribution of the
system-makers was one that was shared in by outsiders-vi., a certain number of aperqus or
insights." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 1, 1918), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 10, at 261, 261. Holmes also wrote, "[Wu's] profes-
sor Stammler is deeply occupied with the forms of thought-like a true German. I wrote the
other day, though not to Mr. Wu, that infinite meditation upon a pint pot wouldn't give one a
gill of beer, and that I was more concerned with the contents than the forms." Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 2, 1923), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LET-
TERS, supra, at 120, 120. The contemporary American response is little changed.
31 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Nov. 23, 1905), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS, supra note 10, at 122, 122.
32 See CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE (Christian Joerges
& David M. Trubek eds., 1989).
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hopelessly obsessive in their demand for universal consistency. The
consensus at the end was that there was something to each critique.
Autopoiesis has often been compared to one of the popular meta-
phors in the United States for the rule of law-semi-autonomy.3 3
Autopoiesis is clearly preferable: its theorists attempt rigorous defini-
tions. Semi-autonomy simply means that law cannot be completely
explained by the material substructure or by wholly autonomous legal
practices and that the result is complicated. Thick description, popu-
lar these days as the appropriate method through which to explore
semi-autonomy, is, at least in the hands of many of those who claim
to use it, the abandonment of theory masquerading as theory. Facts
and stories are in; theory, at least temporarily, is Cinderella.
As Dean Wolfe notes, Professor Luhmann has on occasion re-
pressively-but uncharacteristically-asserted that with autopoiesis,
nothing further need be said. 4 It may or may not be some consola-
tion that this conference suggests the contrary. Viewing academic
discourse as an autopoietic system, I am not surprised.
33 See Richard Lempert, The Autonomy of Law: Two Visions Compared, in AUTOPOIETIC
LAW, supra note 1, at 152.
34 Wolfe, supra note 14, at 1735.
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